sexta-feira, 30 de janeiro de 2009
quinta-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2009
THE SOROS INVESTMENT YEAR - FT - Mto bom
Not only one of the best ever but also very humble...eitcha cara macho...acho que vou mandar meu CV pra ele...acho que perdeu grandes oportunidades em commodities por falta de trader, hihihi
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/0/b55/631
THE SOROS INVESTMENT YEAR:
Positions I took were too big for ever more volatile markets
Although I positioned myself reasonably well for what was coming last year,
one thing I got wrong cost me dearly: there was no decoupling between
markets of the developed and developing worlds.
Indian and Chinese stocks were hit even harder than those in the US and
Europe. Since we did not reduce our exposure, we lost more money in India
than we had made the year before. Our Chinese manager did better by his
stock selection; we were also helped by the appreciation of the renminbi.
I had to push very hard in my macro-account to offset both these losses and
those incurred by our external managers. This had its own drawback: I
overtraded. The positions I took were too large for the increasingly
volatile markets and, in order to manage my risk, I could not go against
the market in a big way. I had to try to catch minor moves.
That made it difficult to maintain short positions. Although I am an
experienced short-seller, I got caught several times and largely missed the
biggest down-draught, in October and November.
On the long side, where I stuck to my guns, I lost an enormous amount of
money. I was impressed by the potential in the new deep-water oilfield in
Brazil and bought a large strategic position in Petrobras, only to see it
decline by 75 per cent at one point in time. We also got caught in the
developing petrochemical industry in the Gulf.
We did get out of our strategic long position in CVRD, the Brazilian iron
ore producer, in time for the end of the commodity bubble and shorted the
other big iron ore groups. But we missed an opportunity in the commodities
themselves – partly because I knew from experience how difficult it is to
trade them.
I was also slow to recognise the reversal of fortune for the dollar and
gave back a large portion of our profits. Under the direction of my new
chief investment officer, we did make money in the UK, where we bet that
short-term interest rates would decline and shorted sterling against the
euro. We also made good money by going long on the credit markets after
their collapse.
Eventually I understood that the strength of the dollar was due not to
people choosing to hold dollars but to their inability to maintain or roll
over their dollar obligations. In a very real sense the strength of the
dollar, like the fever associated with sickness, was a measure of the
disruption of the financial system. This insight helped me to anticipate
the downturn of the dollar at the end of 2008. As a result, we ended the
year almost meeting my target of 10 per cent minimum return, after spending
most of the year in the red.
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/0/b55/631
THE SOROS INVESTMENT YEAR:
Positions I took were too big for ever more volatile markets
Although I positioned myself reasonably well for what was coming last year,
one thing I got wrong cost me dearly: there was no decoupling between
markets of the developed and developing worlds.
Indian and Chinese stocks were hit even harder than those in the US and
Europe. Since we did not reduce our exposure, we lost more money in India
than we had made the year before. Our Chinese manager did better by his
stock selection; we were also helped by the appreciation of the renminbi.
I had to push very hard in my macro-account to offset both these losses and
those incurred by our external managers. This had its own drawback: I
overtraded. The positions I took were too large for the increasingly
volatile markets and, in order to manage my risk, I could not go against
the market in a big way. I had to try to catch minor moves.
That made it difficult to maintain short positions. Although I am an
experienced short-seller, I got caught several times and largely missed the
biggest down-draught, in October and November.
On the long side, where I stuck to my guns, I lost an enormous amount of
money. I was impressed by the potential in the new deep-water oilfield in
Brazil and bought a large strategic position in Petrobras, only to see it
decline by 75 per cent at one point in time. We also got caught in the
developing petrochemical industry in the Gulf.
We did get out of our strategic long position in CVRD, the Brazilian iron
ore producer, in time for the end of the commodity bubble and shorted the
other big iron ore groups. But we missed an opportunity in the commodities
themselves – partly because I knew from experience how difficult it is to
trade them.
I was also slow to recognise the reversal of fortune for the dollar and
gave back a large portion of our profits. Under the direction of my new
chief investment officer, we did make money in the UK, where we bet that
short-term interest rates would decline and shorted sterling against the
euro. We also made good money by going long on the credit markets after
their collapse.
Eventually I understood that the strength of the dollar was due not to
people choosing to hold dollars but to their inability to maintain or roll
over their dollar obligations. In a very real sense the strength of the
dollar, like the fever associated with sickness, was a measure of the
disruption of the financial system. This insight helped me to anticipate
the downturn of the dollar at the end of 2008. As a result, we ended the
year almost meeting my target of 10 per cent minimum return, after spending
most of the year in the red.
Dollar Index
Eita moedinha safada da porra...diria um amigo meu do NE. Continua no canal de alta comprado 10X40
Ibov RELATIVO
BENCHMARK: IBOV rendeu algo como 8% nesta puxada desde o fechamento, nas mínimas, do dia 20 de janeiro.
Os slides anexos mostram as out e under performers deste trend de curto prazo.
Dolar agora a 2.2525, new 14 days new low…bom direcional….
quarta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2009
Goldman Sachas sugere venda de dólares
Se o DOLLAR index começar a se desvalorizar será um ótimo argumento para apreciar BRL e ativos denominados em BRL tipo IBOV e equities em reais.
terça-feira, 27 de janeiro de 2009
segunda-feira, 26 de janeiro de 2009
sexta-feira, 23 de janeiro de 2009
Shrinking Banks
Gamblers!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Die!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!or F5(Refresh)
Emerging market banks growing importance!!!!
My precioussss: Gold needs to decide. Or dá or desce...
DXY is not helping gold right now. It is expected to start losing value in the next couple of weeks helping gold to break to the north way.
quinta-feira, 22 de janeiro de 2009
Barclays leads commodities consolidation: John Kemp
By John Kemp
LONDON, Jan 16 (Reuters) - The sale of the base metals, oil and North American power and gas trading businesses of UBS to Barclays Capital, announced on Friday morning, marks a further step towards consolidation of the commodity trading industry around three large investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Barclays) and a handful of large physical trading firms (Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland, Koch Industries and Glencore, as well as oil majors such as BP and Shell).
As expected, the commodity trading business is polarising. At one end, business is consolidating around large institutions with sufficient capital and access to liquidity to offer a full range of customer services -- from simple index products and exchange-traded funds to futures and options execution, physical trading, inventory financing and more complex bespoke hedging and risk-management strategies.
Most will also use the liquidity and information advantages provided by customer flow to run successful proprietary trading activities alongside their customer-focused operations. At the other end, banks able to offer access to fairly simple products such as indexes and exchange-traded funds to their customers from a small desk at much lower cost will survive, as will small niche players able to run proprietary trading operations in one or two commodity markets where they have detailed knowledge and unique advantages.
The mid-tier of banks and trading firms, running relatively high-cost trading businesses and trying to operate across multiple commodity markets where they have no clear information advantage, is already disappearing.
The space they inhabit is being squeezed from above by the greater risk appetite and liquidity the top tier firms are able to provide to their customers, and from below by the lower cost of small-scale execution-only businesses.
As the middle ground vanishes, the challenge for mid-tier players is to bulk up to become one of the handful of large and dominant players, or scale down and focus on low-cost execution. The number of mid-tier traders has already been shrinking for more than a year. Bank of America and BNP Paribas have both withdrawn from some commodity activities. The commodity businesses of Bear Stearns were consolidated into those of fellow-trader JPMorganChase following Bear's failure in early 2008. The commodity trading business of Lehman Brothers was consolidated into Barclays after Lehman failed in the autumn.
Now UBS is quitting most of the commodity businesses other than precious metals (which trade like foreign exchange), as well as plain vanilla commodity indices and ETFs that can be offered a low cost and minimal risk.
Of all the players in the industry, Barclays has made the most determined effort to break into the top tier previously dominated by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Between 2002 and H1 2008, Barclays increased its appetite for commodity trading risk (measured by average daily value-at-risk) from
1.8 million pounds to 23.7 million pounds. By the first half of last year, the average amount of risk being carried in Barclays' commodity trading book was comparable to Goldman Sachs ($48 million average daily VaR in Q2
2008) and Morgan Stanley ($39 million); the investment bank was on the brink of joining the top table. Barclays' subsequent acquisition of the commodity trading businesses from Lehman Brothers and UBS will ensure it is one of the top three commodity banks in the world.
INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING
Consolidation and polarisation of the commodity trading business is being driven by both cyclical and structural factors:
(1) Like other parts of the financial services industry, commodity trading has experienced a massive expansion over the last five years, and now faces a period of cyclical consolidation as the boom ends. Like other financial businesses, commodity trading is showing signs of excess capacity. Much of the new volume over the past half-decade has come from a dramatic increase in the amount of investment money allocated to passive commodity indices and more actively hedge funds. The amount of underlying business tied to physical trading activity has grown much more slowly. There are now too many banks and traders chasing too little underlying flow. So far, traders have been protected by the increased investment business from hedge funds and pension funds. But as the hedge fund sector retrenches, and pension funds come under pressure to adopt more conservative investment strategies, the commodity trading sector's overcapacity will become increasingly apparent.
(2) Enron's implosion in October and November 2001 demonstrated the inherent limitations suffered by stand-alone trading firms. The model's basic problem has been over-reliance on short-term funding from the money markets -- or investors with relatively short monthly or quarterly lock-ins
-- to fund investments which are much more long term and less liquid. Like a commercial bank borrowing short and lending long, prop shops have been vulnerable to maturity mismatch and liquidity risks. Proprietary trading operations located with major commercial and investment banks have been more secure because they have access to a wider range of funding sources, and the parent company can ultimately call upon the central bank as lender of last resort. But as the financial crisis has intensified since summer 2008, bank leaders and central bank officials have begun asking hard questions about the risk-adjusted returns from all proprietary trading operations, including commodities, and the implicit risk subsidy from the depositor-base as well as the taxpayer.
Banks which have been able to survive while largely or completely declining taxpayer-funded rescues (Barclays, Goldman and Morgan Stanley) are in a much stronger position to preserve or aggressively expand commodity trading and other proprietary activities. Rivals that have been forced to accept state-funding are under pressure to demonstrate proprietary trading profits are not being subsidised by the rest of the bank at ultimate risk to the taxpayer. Pressure on state-rescued banks to prioritise real-economy lending rather than financial-side trading businesses is accelerating the flow of business towards the big three, none of which was explicitly rescued by government.
(3) The quest for consistent profits ("alpha") from proprietary trading is largely based on a misconception. Not everyone can beat the market. By definition, for every dollar of positive, there must be a dollar of negative alpha somewhere else, since the average is by definition just that. It would be nice to think alpha would accrue to the brightest and best intellects. Unfortunately, the financial services industry is populated by brilliant talents. The chances of being smarter than everyone else are not that high, and intellectual brilliance alone does not guarantee long-term profitability. Very few prop traders can consistently outperform the market in the long run for reasonable risk.
As noted in a previous column there are only four sustainable sources of alpha-generating advantage:
(a) Superior access to information (both from greater proximity to the market and other players, as well as the type of "inside information" that the regulators frown upon but which has proved the lifeblood of markets and impossible to eradicate).
(b) The ability to dominate pricing by running large positions relative to the size of the overall market and therefore move the market in the traders' own direction (either taking big enough prop positions, or drawing a large volume of customers into reinforcing trades).
(c) The ability to run complementary and reinforcing positions in related markets (eg cash, physical and derivatives) so positions in one can be used to support positions in another.
(d) Using significant leverage to magnify marginal trading advantages on thousands of trades (the strategy of picking up nickels in front of steamrollers).
For the time being the use of leverage to juice up returns is not an option. So successful prop trading strategies will be based around superior access to information, ability to run large positions, and presence in related markets. All these advantages will favour the top tier firms which can consolidate the market, grab the largest share of customer flow and maintain a presence in all elements of the industry.
((john.kemp@thomsonreuters.com; reuters messaging: john.kemp.reuters.com@reuters.net; +44 207 542 9726))
Keywords: COLUMN KEMP/ =2 LONDON Friday, 16 January 2009 12:32:44[nLG589410]
quarta-feira, 21 de janeiro de 2009
American Dollars : DXY Index : Should DXY continue to get value after Obama's arriving? (+23 % IN 6 MONTHS)
Resist: 90 Buy Mid year 90 call Sell 95 same duration Call
Support: 80 Buy mid year 80 put Sell 70 same duration Put
READ: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_dollar WIKIPEDIA
Commodities: Decisive point : CRB needs to decide
Taking a look to the daily CRB need to decide if it break up and start a recovery or if it has a new leg down. +30% or -30%?
Quarterly chart shows STRONG support 15% below.
terça-feira, 20 de janeiro de 2009
sexta-feira, 16 de janeiro de 2009
quinta-feira, 15 de janeiro de 2009
PROX RESISTENCIAS BRL
2.43 > 2,47 > 2,50 > 2.55 > 2.62 [] new retracement happens after that [STOPS] resist 2.65 > 2.70 .
Major support 2.20
quarta-feira, 14 de janeiro de 2009
WSJ: A Wave of Buying Hits Commodity Funds
A Wave of Buying Hits Commodity Funds
By CAROLYN CUI
In recent weeks, commodity funds have seen an influx of several billion
dollars, a stark reversal from the brutal forced selling that dominated
the second half of last year.
Most of the money has flowed into long-only vehicles -- funds that bet on
prices to rise -- suggesting a combination of investors' revived
confidence
and portfolio rebalancing. This wave of fresh buying is partly behind the
rally in some commodities that petered out a few days ago, and could
bring more liquidity into the market. (Please see related article on C8.)
"One thing that has changed significantly in recent weeks is the attitude
of investors to commodity exposure," Barclays Capital said in a research
note on Thursday.
In December, investors poured $3.9 billion into commodity exchange-traded
securities, or ETFs and ETNs, which held a total of $36.2 billion in
assets as of the end of 2008, according to fund data tracker National Stock
Exchange.
Among commodities, oil and gold funds are among those seeing the most
interest. Last month, the United States Oil Fund, the largest oil ETF,
gained $2.06 billion in net assets, and $603 million went into SPDR Gold
Shares, the largest gold ETF backed with the physical metal, over the
same period, according to National Stock Exchange. A silver ETF, iShares
Silver Trust, had a net inflow of $37 million.
PIMCO Commodity Real Return Strategy fund, the largest commodity index fund
with $6.2 billion in assets, says it has seen a consistent cash inflow
every business day through Thursday since Dec. 15. The fund had been losing
assets since last summer. Meanwhile, some hedge funds that survived last
summer's carnage are looking to open new funds.
For the PIMCO fund, a popular vehicle used by many pension funds and
endowments, about 25% to 30% of the latest buying was due to year-end
asset allocation rebalancing, estimates Mihir Worah, the fund's portfolio
manager.
The rest came from "new investors who think the selloff was overdone," he
says. Another big index fund, the $892 million Oppenheimer Commodity
Strategy Total Return Fund, also showed a gain of assets last month,
according to Morningstar Inc., a provider of fund data.
Commodities' crash in the second half of last year shocked some new
participants and proved a huge disappointment for those counting on the
sector's diversification value. But many commodities were brought back to
levels not seen in years, possibly creating opportunity for investors
seeking long-term exposure to prices of raw materials. Colorado's Public
Employees' Retirement Association, a pension fund that
oversees about $30 billion in assets, got board approval in June, as prices
peaked, to invest up to 3% of its portfolio. The fund is currently
considering the timing of an investment and is screening external managers.
"We believe the original rationale for commodity investing is intact," said
Jennifer Paquette, the fund's chief investment officer in an email.
"Recent pricing moves make our entry more interesting." The California
Public Employees' Retirement System, the largest pension in the U.S., said
last
month that it is looking at other potential opportunities to enhance
returns of its long-only commodities portfolio. The $183.9 billion fund
said it had about $1.3 billion invested in indexed commodities swaps in
mid-October.
Some hedge funds are wading deeper into commodities. These managers could
be betting both long and short in the market. The N.I.R. Group, a New
York-based hedge fund which manages $7 billion in assets, just opened an
internal commodity fund up 27% last year to outside investors.
Galena Asset Management, a subsidiary of Dutch commodity trading firm
Trafigura Group that manages about $600 million, is planning to add an
energy fund to its suite of funds, the firm says.
In other markets: OIL: The next OPEC meeting, scheduled for March, will
discuss a new output production cut as an option and may be brought forward
if prices keep
falling, Iran's governor to the producer group said Sunday. His comments
come as oil prices continue to slide despite mounting evidence OPEC
members have been at least in part fulfilling the pledges to reduce output
they made at their last meeting in mid-December.
Muhammad Ali Khatibi said: "If the downward trend continues, I would not be
surprised if there is an emergency meeting before March. It will be
necessary." -Gregory Meyer and Benoit Faucon contributed to this article.
segunda-feira, 12 de janeiro de 2009
sexta-feira, 9 de janeiro de 2009
quinta-feira, 8 de janeiro de 2009
Ibov tem que segurar 40000 pontos
Perdeu....suporte nos 39k depois 37k ... cambio estressará se romper pra baixo.....
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